The Standard of Morality, Part II

II. The True Standard

It is correct to say that the divine will of God is the supreme and universal norm to which all human willing must conform to be morally right and good. It is also true that a free deliberate act of man is morally good only in so far as in it and through it is being fulfilled the primary end proposed by infinite wisdom and decreed by infinite will in creating man and placing him as a rational free creature in the ordered universe. But the question arises: what evidence is there to base a judgment regarding the relation of man's free act to the will and the intention of God under the circumstances of each particular concrete case? In itself that relation is not a self-evident fact. Without a more proximate criterion, therefore, man cannot know what human conduct is morally good and what morally bad.

Again, it is perfectly correct to say that, to act in a manner befitting a rational creature, man must follow the dictates of right reason and that they are a rule or standard of morality. But human reason is liable to error. Its function is not to create but to perceive and know truth. Its judgments are true only in so far as they conform to objective truth. There is need, therefore, of an objective standard, of objective evidence of truth, by which man is directed and moved in forming the dictates of right reason.

We also admit, and in a later chapter will prove, that the certain dictates of one's own conscience are an infallible guide to good moral conduct - on one condition. But what is the condition laid down?

That, in the case of an erroneous conscience, the error is not due to culpable neglect on our part to acquire a knowledge of the objective evidence in the case. To be a dictate of conscience, in the only true sense of the word, a judgment must be based on some objective principle perceived as certain. Ignorance excuses from guilt only when it is ignorance that is invin­cible and therefore involuntary and inculpable. In a word, in forming our conscience we should be guided by objective evidence, an objective criterion of morality; for each man's conscience dictates prudence, due circumspection, due consideration of the objective circumstances, according to the nature and importance of the act contemplated. And there­fore is it that when one has a prudent doubt regarding the morality of the act, his real conscience is an imperative dictate not to put the act before removing the doubt by having recourse to an evident objective standard of right and wrong.

Is not the moral order a true standard of morality, an objective criterion, universal and unchangeable, by direct evidence of which man may be infallibly directed in judg­ing of the moral goodness and badness of human actions? It is certain that it is. This is evident from what we have said in the preceding section on the nature of essential order, the objective moral order.

In the following thesis we use the expression "rational human nature as such adequately taken" as synonymous with "the objective moral order." In the explanation of the terms of our thesis we shall give our reason for so doing.

Thesis. The True Standard or Proximate Objective Criterion of Morality is Rational Human Nature as Such Adequately Taken.

Explanation. - We are speaking of the morality of the human act. We have already defined what we mean by a human act, morality, moral goodness and badness.

What is meant by rational human nature as such? We mean human nature as endowed with reason and free will. It is through the faculty of reason or intellect that man is capable of perceiving the objective order established by God and of conforming his conduct to the essential rela­tions therein perceived, thus fulfilling the purpose of his existence in that order. It is as endowed with free will that he has the physical power of determining his own conduct.

He can disregard the essential relations of the ob­jective order: but he may not, that is, he is not morally free to do so. The human will is essentially subordinate to the Creator's will, and the Creator has willed all the essen­tial relations of the objective order. In willing the order and conceding free will to man, God wills the exercise of human liberty within the limits of the order. Any use of free will outside the restrictions thus imposed is an abuse of the concession as granted and opposed to God's will. It is deliberate resistance to God's will, an offence against God's authority. If not retracted by true repentance, it cannot be forgiven: and if not forgiven, it will inevitably meet with punishment. The preservation and the restora­tion of order demand that retribution be made to infinite majesty offended. No rebellion against God can stand forth justified or be crowned with final success.

What is meant by rational human nature adequately taken? It means human nature viewed not only in all that constitutes man a member of a distinct species, but also with all that distinguishes one individual from another; viewed, moreover, not only in itself, but with all its relations to other beings - to God, to fellow men, to parents, to country, to irrational creatures, - with all its natural facul­ties and tendencies and exigencies, with all the essential relations that exist between its various parts and between the parts and the complete rational nature. In a word, rational human nature as such adequately taken is human nature as it really exists and manifests itself to man.

From what is set down in the last two paragraphs, it is clear that rational human nature as such adequately taken is really identical with the objective moral order outlined in the first section of this chapter. But the expression "rational human nature as such adequately taken" brings out explicitly the relation of morality to man's nature, plainly indicating at the same time that no act can truly perfect that nature unless it be an act duly conformed to the essential relations established by God. No matter what its seeming goodness, material or spiritual, an act opposed to any relation founded on the essence of God's humblest creature is an act opposed to God's essence, the infinite prototype and exemplar of all created essences and the 'ultimate foundation of all essential relations. It is an act opposed to man's highest interests and the true progress of the human race.

What is a criterion? In our thesis the word "standard" is used as synonymous with the phrase "proximate objective criterion." A criterion is commonly defined as "a standard by which to determine the correctness of a judg­ment or conclusion." It is that by which man is directed and in view of which he is moved in giving firm assent to a judgment without fear and without danger of error. The criterion of morality, therefore, is the standard by which man is so guided in judging of the moral goodness and badness of a free deliberate act.

The word objective imports that there must be an objective standard of morality existing outside the human mind. Only when our judgments are based on objective evidence is all danger of error removed. Kant made a fun­damental mistake in holding that the imperative dictates of practical reason were an infallible criterion of morality, even though not motived by objective evidence. This is exaggerated subjectivism. It is an evident fact that the human mind can and does make mistakes, and may, under the influence of the will, give firm assent to error. To prevent mistakes and avoid error in its judgments and practical dictates, man's subjective power of perceiving and judging (whether it be called pure reason or practical reason) must be directed and determined by an objective standard that clearly manifests itself as an infallible criterion.

That such a standard exists will appear from the proof of our thesis. Brute animals, not possessed of reason and free will, are guided by instincts implanted in their nature by God. Man, a rational free being, must determine his choice between moral good and evil, and freely choosing the good thus direct his free deliberate act towards the primary end intended by God in creating him and granting him a free will. To do so, as we have just seen, he needs an objective standard of morality. The infinitely wise Creator could not fail to provide for that essential need.

The term proximate implies that the criterion pre­sented in our thesis is a standard by which man can acquire direct and intrinsic evidence of the moral goodness or bad­ness of a human action and can thus unerringly determine the correctness of his judgment regarding the morality of the action, without having recourse to any more immediate moral criterion. By reference to this standard it may be­come perfectly evident that certain laws or opinions or cus­toms are morally bad; and that there are many human actions which are essentially bad and opposed to man's supreme good and which no seeming good or progress or development, whether of the individual or the State or the human race, can ever justify. The command of an evidently good and loving parent, the example of evidently good men, judgments universally held by men through cen­turies, the evidently beneficial or harmful results of a mode of action, are infallible guides only in so far as through them the relation of the action to the standard set down in our thesis is made objectively evident. By referring to this standard, a little child may at times perceive and judge, without fear or danger of error, that the command or ex­ample given by parent or teacher is morally bad and for­bidden, an act opposed to some evident relation of man to God or fellow man. The ordinary child soon perceives the evident essential relation that exists between itself and its parents and the obligation of obeying the commands of its parents - except they command what it clearly perceives to be bad, e.g., a theft or a lie.

Proof of Thesis. - The standard to which human reason must refer to determine unerringly the relation of a human action to the purpose God wills in giving man the physical power to do the act, is the true standard of morality. But to determine that relation unerringly, human reason must refer to rational human nature as such adequately taken.* Therefore rational human nature as such adequately taken is the true standard of morality.

The truth of the first statement in our proof will become evident, if we again consider what is meant by morally good and morally bad human actions. Only then is a human action morally good, when in it and through it man freely fulfills the end or purpose God wills in granting him the physical power to perform the action; only then does it promote the future eternal glory and happiness which God has destined for man and for which man, in the exercise of his free will, must duly dispose himself by willing what God wills to accomplish through him in this life. It would be irrational, and therefore unbefitting man and morally bad, not thus to subordinate all his free deliberate actions to the supreme good and crowning glory of his existence. The present fulfilling of God's will is an evident condition imposed on man's will in God's plan for man's supreme happiness and glory. Therefore the true standard of morality is that to which human reason must refer to de­termine unerringly the relation of a human action to the purpose God wills in giving man the physical power to do the free deliberate act.

The truth of the second statement in our proof is thus established. From our explanation of the phrases "rational human nature as such adequately taken" and "the moral order," it is evident that they 'ire synonymous. Rational human nature as such adequately taken is the existing ob­jective order based on the essences of things and established by God as a means towards the end He willed in creating man. But that order is the only evidence, the only standard or criterion, to which human reason can refer to determine unerringly whether this or that human action is in accord with the purpose God wills in giving man the physical power to do the action, or whether it is contrary to God's design and therefore an abuse of the power granted, a use outside the restrictions manifested to man by God in assigning him a definite position in the order conceived by infinite wisdom and decreed by infinite will. Therefore rational human nature as such adequately taken is the standard to which human reason must refer to determine unerringly the rela­tion of a human action to the purpose God wills in giving man the physical power to do the act.

* In the natural science of ethics we prescind from supernatural revelation. It is evident that one who is certain that God made such revelation, and in it declared this or that action morally good or bad, can make direct appeal to God's word as an infallible criterion of morality.

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Coming next, False Standards.

Adapted from Moral Philosophy
by Rev Charles Coppen, S.J.
(© 1924)